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respected in the intellectual establishment, had spoken to the theme. I found her essay illuminating, not so much for what it says, but for what it is.
The withholding of women from participation in the vita activa, the "common world," and the connection of thus with reproductivity, is something from which she does not so much turn her eyes as stare straight through unseeing, To read such a book, by a woman of large spirit and great erudition, can be painful, because it embodies the tragedy of a female mind nourshed on male ideologies. In fact, the loss is ours, because Arendt's desire to grasp deep moral issues is the knd of concern we need to build a common world which will amount to more than "life-styles."4 Adrienne Rich's verdict on Hannah Arendt is based on certain heurstic assumptions that lead her to the conclusion that one should read Arendt's work "not so much for what it says but for what It is." Reading Hannah Arendt's work though from the standpoint of a question that she herself did not place at the center of her thought, namely the woman's question, and examining her political philosophy in this light require certain innovative hermeneutlcal and interpretive principles that go beyond those traditionally deployed and shared by Rich as well. One very commonly shared principle in the interpretation of texts can be characterized as historicist indifference. Histoncist indifference requires that we understand a text, a theory, a thinker's views in the context of their genesis. This obvious and unproblematic beginning point of any interpretive effort is inadequate when it is accompanied by the further assumption that to understand can only mean to understand in context and that to pose contemporary questions to historical texts is to fall into anachronism.
The second commonly shared postulate of interpretation, and the one most prominently displayed by Adrienne Rich, can be named the self-righteous dogmatism of the latecomers. In posing questions to the past, this attitude assumes that our already attained answers are the right ones. This lund of reading of past texts is particularly prevalent among activists of social movements who, very often, simply juxtapose the misunderstandings of the past to the truths of the present. For the art of reading and appropriating the past such an attitude is inadequate. If we approach tradition and thinkers of the past only to "debunk" them, then there really is no point in seeking to understand them at all. Such dogmatism kills the spirt and dres up the soul, and it is certainly not conducive to the task of "building a common world," in Adnenne Rich's words, "which will amount to more than mere 'life-styles.' "5 In approaching Hannah Arendt's thought from where we stand today and in probing it from the standpoint of her identity as a German-Jewish woman neither princlple is adequate: historcist indifference Is inadequate since it kills the interests of contemporary readers in past texts by blocking the asking of any questions that transcend the immediate historical context in which these texts were written. The self-rghteousness of the latecomers is also misleading in that it would lead us to assume that we can no longer learn from Arendt, that her work has ceased to engage us, that we can treat her as a sociological and psychological curiosity exemplifying the "male-identified female mind." Applied to Hannah Arendt's work, this would mean that all questioning of her work, particularly on the woman's issue, would be considered anachronistic and insensitive to her own historical concerns. Yet as I hope to show in the rest of this essay, such questioning is neither anachronistic nor insensitive to Arendt's own concerns, but to the contrary, can allow us to pursue certain lines of interpretation that shed unusual light on the initial concerns that motivated Arendt's work. In view of the enormity of Arendt's contribution to political thought in this century, I also resist the conclusion that we should only treat her as a sociological curiosity.
How then should we proceed? Asking the woman's question, as always, signifies a movement from center to margin in the hermeneutical task. 6 We begin by searching in the footnotes, in the marginalia, in the less recognized works of a thinker for those "traces" (Spurren) that are left behind by women's presence and more often than not by their absence. For Hannah Arendt's work, this method means that one begins not with The Human Condition but with a text that certainly does not occupy a central place in any systematic interpretation of her political philosophy, namely Rahel Varnhagen, subtitled "The Life of a Jewish Woman."
RAHEL LEVIN VARNHAGEN'S QUEST FOR THE "WORLD"
Hannah Arendt's intellectual biography ofRahel Varnhagen, born as Rahel Levin in Berlin in 1771, was begun in 1929, shortly after she completed her dissertation on Augustine's concept of love under Karl Jaspers's directorship in Heidelberg. This study appears to have been intended as her Habilitatlonsschrift, which was to win her the right to teach in a German University.7 It was completed in 1933 except for the last two chapters, which were finished subsequently during her exile in France in 1938. The book appeared almost twenty years later in 1957 in English translation; the first German edition came out in 1959.8 Rahel Varnhagen, which Arendt subtitled in German "Lebensgeschichte einer deutschen Juedin aus der Romantik," "the life history of a German Jewess from the Romantic period," is a difficult text. An early reviewer found that it is a relentlessly abstract book-slow, cluttered, static, curously oppressive; reading it feels like sitting in a hothouse with no watch. One is made to feel the subject, the waiting distraught woman; one is made aware, almost physically, of her intense feminimty, her frustration. (Sybille Bedford)9 "The relentless abstractness" of the book is in part due to Arendt's methodological angle, which she herself admits is "unusual." "It was never my intention," explains Arendt, to write a book about Rahel; about her personality, which nmght lend itself to various interpretations according to the psychological standards and categories that the author introduces from outside; nor about her position in Romanticlsm and the effect of the Goethe cult in Berlin, of which she was actually the orginator; nor about the significance of her salon for the social history of the period; nor about her ideas and her "Weltanschauung," insofar as these can be reconstructed from her letters. What interested me solely was to narrate the story of Rahel s life as she herself might have told it.
My portrait therefore follows as closely as possible Rahel's own reflections upon herself, although it is naturally couched in different language and does not consist solely of variations upon quotations. (xv-xvi, emphasis added) This claim to "narrate the story of Rahel's life as she herself might have told it" is astonishing. Arendt's confidence in her judgments about Rahel Varnhagen is so deep that she does not fear correcting Rahel's husband's presentation of her. In fact, at one level the book reclaims Rahel's life and memory from the clutches of her husband-the generous and giving, but upright and boring Prussian civil servant Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, who, Arendt maintains, presented Rahel's life such as to make her "associations and circle of friends appear less Jewish and more aristocratic, and to show Rahel herself in a more conventional light, one more in keeping with the taste of the times" (xv). One might wish to ask what gives Arendt this confidence that she, in fact, could know or could claim to know this woman better than her husband? How can she, Arendt, separated from Rahel's death in March 7, 1833 by almost one hundred years at the time of composing her book on Rahel, claim to narrate Rahel's story as she herself "rmght have told it?" What hermeneutical mysteries does this little subjunctive phrase, "might have told it," contain?
The Jaspers is clearly puzzled by the status of the category of "Jewish existence," and by whether or not Arendt is attributing a more fundamental status to this fact than is allowable by the categones of existential philosophy. Jaspers himself sees "Jewish existence" as a wholly contingent or accidental matter-or as he puts it-"a faqon de parler," a manner of speaking, or "the manifestation of a selfhood originally negative in its outlook." Neither individually nor collectively, however, can he see in the matter of "being Jewish" more than a contingency of culture and history or an accident of birth.
Arendt's answer is cautious: she indicates that she has not tried There is an additional dimension to this narration, and it is one that leads more directly to future themes in Arendt's political philosophy. In telling Rahel's story, Arendt is concerned to document a certain form of romantic Innerlichkeit, "inwardness." To live life "as if it were a work of art," writes Arendt, "to believe that by 'cultivation' (Bildung) one can make a work of art of one's life was the great error that Rahel shared with her contemporaries" (xvi). The "claustrophobic" feeling about the book that was noted above, the sensation namely that "one is in a hothouse without a watch" (Sybille Bedford), derives from Arendt's literary success in conveying this sense of endless expectation, of an endless yearning without fulfillment, of inaction coupled with the wish to live and experience most intensely-"What am I doing?" asks Rahel. "Nothing. I am letting life rain upon me" (quoted in xvi). It is this "worldless" sensibility that Arendt finds most objectionable about Rahel. In the opening chapters of the Varnhagen biography that deal with romantic introspection Arendt indicates what she sees as the greatest weakness and ultimately as the "apolitical" quality of romantic Inwardness.
Introspection accomplishes two feats: it annihilates the actual existing situation by dissolving it in mood, and at the same time it lends everything subjective an aura of objectivity, publicity, extreme interest. In mood, the boundaries between what is intimate and what is public become blurred; intimacies are made public, and public matters can be experenced and expressed only in the realm of the intimate-ultimately, in gossip.21
Romantic introspection leads one to lose a sense of reality by losing the boundaries between the public and the prvate, the intimate and the shared. Romantic introspection compounds the "worldlessness" from which Rahel Varnhagen suffers to the very end. The category of the "world" is the missing link between the "worldless" reality of Rahel Levin Varnhagen and her contemporaries and Hannah Arendt's own search for a recovery of the "public world" through authentic political action in her political philosophy. Romantic inwardness displays qualities of mind and feeling that are the exact opposite of those required of political actors and which Arendt highly valued. Whereas romantic introspection blurs the boundaries between the personal and the political, the political qualities of distinguishing sharply and precisely between the public good and the personal sphere are extremely important for Arendt. Whereas the ability to judge the world as it appears to others and from many different points of view is the quintessential eplstemlc virtue in politics, romantic inwardness tends to eliminate the distinction between one's own perspective and those of others through mood. Finally, an interest in the world and a commitment to sustain it is fundamental for politics, whereas romantic inwardness cultivates the soul rather than sustaining the world.
Varnhagen's search for a place in the "world" was defined not only by her identity as a Jew and as a romantic but also as a woman. Although Arendt does not place this theme at the center, her story of Rahel begins to reveal an unthematized gender subtext. In Arendt's account, Varnhagen attempts to regain a place in the world for herself by using typically female strategies. In the concluding paragraphs of her 1956 preface to Rahel Varnhagen Arendt remarks,
The modem reader will scarcely fail to observe that Rahel was neither beautiful nor attractive; that all the men with whom she had any kind of love relationship were younger than she herself; that she possessed no talents with which to employ her extraordinary intelligence and passionate onginality; and finally, that she was a typically "romantic" I want to suggest that at the beginnings of Arendt's work, we discover a different genealogy of modernity than the one so characteristic of her later writings. As distinct from the analysis of The Human Condition, the "rise of the social" in this alternative genealogy of modernity would not refer to the rise of commodity exchange relations in a burgeoning capitalist economy, but would designate the emergence of new forms of sociability, association, intimacy, friendship, speahng and writing habits, tastes in food, manners and arts, as well as hobbles, pastimes, and leisure activities. Furthermore, in the midst of this alternative genealogy of the social is a curious space that is of the home yet public, that is dominated by women yet visited and frequented by men, that is highly mannered yet egalitarian, and that is hierarchical toward the "outsiders" and egalitarian toward its members. What leads Arendt to lose sight of this "other modernity" with which she began and to replace it with a relentless pessimism? Of course, at one level the answer to this question is the Holocaust and the fate of European Jewry that nullified all the ideals of the Enlightenment and modernity in which Rahel's generation still believed. At another level though the answer may be that perhaps Arendt never did lose sight of this other modernity and that her purported "Graecocentrism" is as much a fiction created by us her readers as it is based on her own texts. Let us reread the meaning of the concept of the "social" in Arendt's work in the light of what I am suggesting is an alternative genealogy of modernity.
THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL. AN ALTERNATIVE GENEALOGY OF MODERNITY IN ARENDT'S WORK?
Consider the standard reading of Arendt's political philosophy. For many, Arendt is a nostalgic and antimodernist thinker, who sees in modernity the decline of the public sphere of politics and the emergence of an amorphous, anonymous, uniformlzlng reality that she calls "the social." In this account, the social, by which is meant a form of glorified, national housekeeping in economic and pecuniary matters, displaces the concern with the political, with the res publica, from the hearts and minds of men. The social is the perfect medium in which bureaucracy, the "rule by nobody," emerges and unfolds.
As an account of modernity, this view is jarring in so many ways that it requires a great deal of hermeneutical unchanty to attribute it to a thinker who was as historically grounded and sophisticated as Hannah Arendt was. There are actually three meanings of the term social in Arendt's work. At one level, the "social" refers to the growth of a capitalist commodity exchange economy.23 In the second place, the social refers to aspects of "mass society."24 In the third and least investigated sense, the social refers to "sociability," to the quality of life in civil society and civic associations.
To begin to explore the last and least discussed meaning of the term in Arendt's work, namely the social as sociability and as the quality of civicassociational life, consider now the following passage.
But society equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of equality in the modem world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact that society has conquered the public realm, and that distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual. (HC, 41, emphasis added) By "equality" in this passage, Arendt does not mean political and legal equality, but rather the equalization of tastes, behavior, manners and lifestyles, which is executed by mass society. Under such conditions "distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual." But have they really9 Arendt's historical and political writings on the Jewish question, beginning with her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, reveal quite a different picture. They show that the constant struggle and tension between equality and difference, both in the social and the political domains, is characteristic of modernity. In one of her most illuminating remarks on this dialectic of equality and difference Arendt notes, Equality of condition, though it is certainly a basic requirement for justice, is nevertheless among the greatest and most uncertain ventures of modern mankind. The more equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that actually exist between people; and thus all the more unequal do individuals and groups become. Whenever equality becomes a mundane fact in itself, without any gauge by which it may be measured or explained, then there is one chance in a hundred that It will be recogmzed simply as a working principle of a political orgamzation in which otherwise unequal people have equal nghts; there are mnety-mne chances that it will be mistaken for an innate quality of every individual, who is "normal" if he is like everybody else and "abnormal" if he happens to be different. Thisperversion of equalityfrom apolitical into a social concept is all the more dangerous when a society leaves but little space for special groups and individuals, for then their differences become all the more conspicuous. (OT, 54, emphasis added) Arendt's work as a historian of anti-Semitism brilliantly documents this dialectic of equality and difference, as well as showing how much more complicated and multilayered the dynamics of the social are. Note that the social in this context means sociability; patterns of human interaction; modalities of taste in dress, eating, leisure, and lifestyles generally; differences in aesthetic, religious, and civic manners and outlooks; patterns of socializing, and forming marrlages, friendships, acquaintanceshlps, and commercial exchanges. Undoubtedly, Arendt's attitude toward even this aspect of the social is somewhat ambivalent. It is within this sphere that the homogenization of tastes, attitudes, manners, and lifestyles begins to spread in modernity; this is the sphere in which the parvenu dominates. By contrast, the parah does not fare well in "society." The pariah is an outsider in matters of taste, manners, habits, and frendships. She breaks social conventions and flouts social norms; she goes against established traditions and plays with social expectations. The self-conscious pariah inslsts on the fact of difference and distinction but does so in a manner that is not wholly individualist. The complete pariah would be the total outsider, the marginal bordering on suicide, insanity, or criminality. The self-conscious pariah is one who lives with difference and distinctness in such a way as to establish her difference in the "eyes" of society. The self-conscious pariah requires visibility, requires to be seen "as other" and as "different," even if only by a very small group, by a community of like-minded friends. Paradoxically then, the self-conscious pariah must both reject and affirm the sphere of the social.
This is precisely what Rahel Varnhagen's salon was: a space of sociability In which the individual desire for difference and distinctness could assume an intersubjective reality and in which unusual individuals, and primarily, certain highly talented Jewish women, could find a "space" of visibility and self-expression. The Jewish salonnieres of Berlin were the daughters and wives of well-to-do Jewish merchants and intellectuals who ran large and complex households and whose fathers and husbands were frequently absent from the house in the world of commerce and community affairs. These women accomplished a triple feat through their social activities: first, they emancipated themselves from traditional patriarchal families. Often they refused to marry their designated Jewish future spouses to be; some converted to Chrstianity and lost all ties to the religion of their forebears. Their emancipation as "women" was often coupled with their rejection of traditional Judaism. Second, they helped create high culture in a crucial era at the end of the Enlightenment and the outbreak of romanticism. They did so by creating a "social space" in which Berlin's intelligentsia, writers, artists, as well as civil servants and aristocrats could gather together; exchange ideas, views, and texts; mix and mingle with each other; be seen, heard, and noticed by others. In this respect, they acted as the patrons of the intelligentsia in a city that at the time lacked a university, a parliament, and a generous court. Finally, the salons forged bonds across classes, religious groups, and the two sexes, creating the four walls within which new forms of sociability and intimacy could develop among members of an emergent civil society. 25 What then are the forms of sociability appropriate to the salons? Here a distinction needs to be made between the French and the German versions of this occurrence. In the French salons, which developed in the shadow cast by the courtly regime of the le Rot Soleil, more stylized, ceremonial, and hlerarchlcally defined manners are the norm. In the German salons, developing against the background of a weak aristocracy and a nonexistent courtly public sphere, more spontaneous, less stylized and ceremonial manners dominate. In both cases, the salons bring to life the Enlightenment idea of l'homme, der Mensch, the human being as such. This is the vision that underneath it all, when divested of all our social, cultural, religious accoutrements, ranks and distinction, we are all humans like each other. There is no greater proof of our common humanity besides the fact that we can communicate with and understand each other. The salons are social gatherings in which the "joy of conversation," the joy of communication, and understanding as well as misunderstandings and lack of communication are discovered. This is indeed Rahel Varnhagen's strength to which her admirers testify' the magic of her language, her capacity to express herself, her witticisms, her judgments. Rahel opens a world for those with whom she is communicating through her speech. The joy of speech culminates in friendship, in that meeting of hearts, minds, and tastes between two individuals. Particularly in the case of the German salons, the search for a "Seelensfreund," a friend of one's soul, one who understands oneself perhaps better than oneself, is predominant. With friends one shares one's soul; to share the soul though-an entity that itself comes to be discovered in this new process of lndividuation-one has to project a certain depth of the self, one has to view the self as a being whose public presence does not reveal all. The public reveals and conceals at the same time; It is only in the withdrawal from the public into the sheltered space of a twosome or threesome relationship that one can also move inward, toward who one really is. In this respect as well, the salon is a fascinating space: unlike an assembly hall, a town square, a conference room, or even simply the family dinner table, the salon, with its large, luxurious, and rambling space, allows for moments of Intimacy; in a salon one is with each other but must not always be next to each other. Salons are amorphous structures with no established rules of entry and exit for those who have formed intimacy; in fact, it may be a sign of good manners to foster and to allow the formation of intimacy among members of the salon. What is important here is the fluidity of the lines between the gathering as one and the gathenng as many units of intimacy, and how the salons can be both private and public, both shared and intimate.
A new ideal of humanity; the joy of conversation;26 the search for friendship and the cultivation of intimacy-these are the ideals and aspirations of the salon phenomena in the age of modernity. Of course, the cleavage between Ideals and reality accompany the salons no less than they do other social phenomena: despite their egalitarian humanist rhetoric, class, rank, and religious differences continue to play a role. The salons are not spaces for the whole people, including the laborers, the gardener, the milk maid, and the coach driver. They are largely upper-middle-class phenomena. The working and laboring classes of Europe in this period share a different mode of sociability of their own.27 As Rahel Varnhagen's own experience shows, many of her lovers of noble descent (most notably Count von Finckensteln) are unable to overcome class biases; and with the defeat of the German armies in the hands of Napoleon and the rise of German nationalism, anti-Semitic feelings immediately come to the fore. Neither are the salons protected spaces of friendship and intimacy alone; intrigues, jealousies, petty fighting, and even treachery have their place here; as do erotic and sexual jealousy, infidelity, and betrayal.
The phenomenon of the salons, the predominance of the women among them, the kinds of public spaces they are, and the forms of interaction, speech, and writing most closely associated with them pose fascinating problems for Hannah Arendt's political philosophy. Almost in every respect the salons, as modes of the public sphere, contradict the agonal model of the public sphere of the polis that predominates in The Human Condition. Whereas the Greek polis and the public sphere characteristic of it exclude women (and other members of the household such as children and servants generally), the salons are spaces dominated by female presence. Whereas speech in the public spaces of the polis is "serious," guided by the concern for the "good of all," speech in the salons is playful, amorphous, and freely mixes the good of all with the advantage of each. Whereas the public sphere of the polis attempts to exclude and to suppress eros, the salons cultivate the erotic. Of course, the erotic is never silenced in the Greek public sphere either: more often than not, it assumes a homosexual rather than heterosexual form. Whereas the spaces of the polis are governed by the ideals of "visibility" and "transparency," eighteenth-century salons are also governed by "visibility," but not by transparency self-revelation and self-concealment, even pretending to be quite other than one is, are the norms.
Yet the salons and the polis also have features in common: they are based on assumptions of equality among the participants. In the case of the polis, this is the isonomia of political rank as citizen and of economic independence as oikos despotes. For the salon participants, equality is an ideal based on their shared humanity and their specific talents, abilities, and capabilities as individuals sharing certain tastes and sensibilities. Such equality prevails against otherwise existing social, economic, and even political inequality among salon members. Both the public spheres of the polis and the salons form bonds among their members. According to Aristotle, "friendship" among citizens of the polis is the virtue that good lawgivers try most to cultivate.28 The salons are also spaces in which friendships are formed: these frlendships are more personal than political, but here again the lines are not clear; the salons are spaces in which personal friendships may result in political bondings (what we nowadays ubiquitously refer to as "networking"). In effect, both the polis and the salons contribute to the formation of "civic friendshlp," either among a group of citizens or among a group of private, like-minded individuals who can gather for a common political purpose.29 If we proceed to decenter Arendt's political thought, if we read her work from the margins toward the center, then we can displace her fascination with the polis to make room for her more modernist and women-fnendly reflections on the salons. The "salons" must be viewed as transitory but also 24. When focusing on tlus aspect of the nse of the social, Arendt introduces such contrasts as between "behavior" and "action." Whereas behavior is the ideal typical activities of individuals insofar as they are the bearers of social roles, that is, the bureaucrat, the businessman, the executive, and so on, action is indivlduating and indivldualizing behavior; it reveals the self rather than concealing him or her behind the social mask. "It is decisive that society," writes Arendt, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement. (HC, 40) There is no analysis in Arendt's conslderations on these matters in The Human Condition of the mechamsms of social control and integration through which such homogemzation, leveling, and "normalization" are achieved. 
